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[L. A. No. 29598. In Bank. Feb. 13, 1969.] 
HOLIDAY INNS OF AMERICA, INC., et at, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, v. D. :MANLEY KNIGHT et at, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
[1] Forfeitures - Relief - Under Statute. - The proscriptions of 
Civ. Code, § 3275, against forfeiture apply in any case in which 
o the party seeking relief from default has brought himself with-
in the terms of the section by pleading and proving facts that 
justify its application; and in determining whether a given 
case falls within the statute, it is necessary to consider the 
nature of the contract and the specific clause in question. 
'[2] Id.-Relief-Under Statute-Time as Essence of Condition. 
-In a proper case, relief will be granted under Civ. Code, 
§ 3275, providing for relief in case of forfeiture, from a provi-
sion of a contract making time of the essence in tendering 
annual payments thereunder. 
[5] Id.-Relief-Under Statute.-In an action by optionee's sue· 
cessors to declare effective a Written contract granting a five-
. year option to purchase real estate with the price for the 
option payable in five annual instalments, plaintiffs ;were enti-
tled to summary judgment declaring the contract in' force, by 
way of relief under Civ. Code, § 3275, relating to relief in case 
of forfeiture if the contract were terminated, where it 
appeared that the fourth instalment was not paid precisely on 
time, that on a risk allocation basis each instalment was par- 0 
tially for an option to buy the land during that year and par-
tially for renewal of the option for another year, that plaintiffs 
o would suffer a forfeiture of that part of the three instalments 
previously paid attributable to the right to exercise the option 
during the last two years 0 by requiring payment strictly on 
time, that plaintiffs were willing and able to continue with 
performance of the contract and acted in good faith to 
accomplish that end, and that optionor would receive the bene-
0' fit of his bargain, the full price of the option granted. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Orange County. Herbert S. Herlands, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. . 
[1] Relief of purchaser against forfeiture of land contract, note, 
40 A.L.R. 182. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Forfeitures and Penalties, § 24 
et seq; Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser (1st ed § 642). 
!ticK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Forfeitures, § 17(1); [2] For-
feitures, § 17(3) . 
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Action seeking a declaration that a contract was in full 
force and effect. Summary judgment for defendants reversed 
with directions. 
Greenberg & Glusker, Arthur N. Greenberg and Harvey R. 
Friedman for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
Gordon X. Richmond for Defendants and Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment for 
defendants in an action seeking a declaration that a contract 
was still effective. The judgment was entered after plaintiffs' . 
motion for a summary judgment was denied and defendants' 
motion for summary judgment was granted. 
The pleadings and affidavits of the parties establish the 
following undisputed facts. 
Plaintiffs are the successors in interest to the optionee 
under a written option contract between the optionee and the 
owners of the option property, defendant D. Manley Knight 
and his mother Mary Knight. Mary Knight is now deceased 
and D. Manley Knight is the sole owner of the property. 
Although his wife is also named a defendant herein, she has 
no interest in the contract or the option property. We will 
therefore refer to D. Manley Knight as defendant. 
The contract, executed on September 30, 1963, granted: an 
option to purchase real property in Orange County I for 
$198,633, the price to be subject, however, to prescribed 
adjustments for changes in the cost of living. Unless cancelled 
as provided in the agreement, the option could be exercised by 
giving written notice thereof no later than April 1, 1968. The 
contract provided for an initial payment of $10,000 and for 
four additional payments of $10,000 to be made directly to 
the optionors on July 1 of each year, commencing in 1964, . 
unless the option was exercised or cancelled before the· next 
such payment became due. These payments were not to be 
applied to the purchase price. The cancellation provision pro-
vided that "it is mutually understood that failure to make 
payment on or before the prescribed date will automatically 
cancel this option without further notice." On December 9, 
1963, the parties- amen'ded the contract by executing escrow 
instructions that provided that the annual payments were to 
be deposited in escrow with the Security Title Insurance 
Company, and that, in "the event you [Security Title] do not 
receive the $10,000 annual payments [by July 1] and upon 
receiving notice from 'Optionors to cancel the option, without 
i· ~ 
)-
\) 
) 
Feb.1969] HOLIDAY INNS OF AMERICA 11. KNIGHT 329 
(70 C.2d 327; 74 Cal.Rptr. 722, 450 P.2d 42] 
further instructions from Optionee you are to terminate the 
escrow. " 
The initial payment of $10,000 and the annual installm°ents 
for 1964 and 1965 were paid. After the execution of the con-
tract, plaintiffs expended "great amounts of money" to 
develop a major residential and commercial center on the land 
adjacent to the option property. These expenditures have 
caused the option property to increase substantially in value 
since the contract was executed. Plaintiffs' purpose in enter-
ing into the contract was to put themselves in a position to 
secure the advantage of this increase in value resulting from 
their development efforts. 
In 1966 plaintiffs mailed a check for $10,000 to defendant. 
It was made out to D. Manley Knight and his wife, Lavinia 
Knight, and dated June 30, 1966. Defendant received the 
° check on July 2, 1966 and returned it to plaintiffs on July 8, 
stating that the option contract was cancelled. On July 8 
plaintiffs tendered another check directly to defendant, and 
he again refused it. On July 15 plaintiffs deposited a $10,000 
check with Security Title payable to defendant. Security Title 
tendered the check to defendant, but his attorney returned it 
to plaintiffs on JUly 27 and advised them that the agreement 
was terminated pursuant to the cancellation provision. 
Plaintiffs contend that payment of the annual installment 
was timely on the ground that the check became the property 
of defendant when mailed; that even if the payment was late, 
the trial court should have relieved them from forfeiture and 
declared the option in force under section 3275 of the Civil 
Code; and that, in any event, the trial court erred in exclud-
ing extrinsic evidence offered to prove that the escrow instruc-
tions modified the contract to permit payment at any time 
before defendant notified the title company that the option 
was cancelled. Since the undisputed facts establish that plain-
tiffs are entitled to relief from forfeiture pursuant to section 
3275, it is unnecessary to consider plaintiffs' other conten-
tions. 1 
Section 3275 provides: "Whenever, by the terms of an obli-
gation, a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in tbe 
lPlaintiifll' initial declaration in support of their motion for summary 
judgment was insufficient to support a judgment in their favor. Before 
entering judgment for defendants, however, the trial court agreed to 
reconsider its initial ruling on the motions of both plaintiffs and defend-
ants for summary jUdgment, and additional declarations were filed. The 
undisputed facts establishing plaintiffs' right to relief from forfeiture 
appear from the declarations filed by both aides. 
) 
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nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure to comply with 
its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making full 
compensation to the other party, except in the case of a 
grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty." 
The tumultuous history of this section has been recorded in a 
lengthy series of major decisions in the area of property and 
contract law.2 
[1] Although most of the cases considering section 3275 
have involved land sale contracts, its proscriptions against 
forfeiture apply in any case in which the party seeking relief 
from default has brought himself within the terms of the 
section by pleading and proving facts that justify its applica-
tion. (Barkis v. Scott, supra, at pp. 118, 120.) In determining 
whether a given case falls within section 3275, however, it is 
necessary to consider the nature of the contract and the speci-
fic clause in question. Although the contract in the instant 
case is an option contract, the question is not whether the 
exercise of the option was timely, but whether the right to 
exercise the option in the future was forfeited by a failure to 
pay the consideration for that right precisely on time. De-
fendant's reliance on Cummings v. Bullock (9th Cir. 1966) 
367 F.2d 182, and Wilson v. Ward (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 390 
[317 P .2d 1018], is therefore misplaced. Both those cases dealt 
with the time within which an option must be exercised and 
correctly held that such time cannot be extended beyond that 
provided in the contract. To hold otherwise would give the 
optionee, not the option he bargained for, but a longer and 
therefore more extensive option. [2] In the present case, 
however, plaintiffs are not seeking to extend the period during. 
2Gloc7c v. Howard cf Wilson Colony Co. (1898) 123 Cal. 1 [55 P. 713, 
G9 Am.St.Rep. 17,43 L.R.A. 199]; Bar7cis v. Scott (1949) 34 Cal.2d 116 
1208 P.2d 367]; Baffa v. Johnson (1950) 35 Cal.2d 36 [216 P.2d 13]; 
Freedman v. Rector etc. ot St. Matthias Parish (1951) 37 Cal.2d 16 
1!:!30 P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R.2d 1]; Ward v. Union Bond cf Trust Co. (9th 
Cir. 1957) 243 F.2d 476; Caplan v. Schroeder (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 515 [15 
Cal.Rptr. 145, 364 P.2d 321]; Crane, Recent Decisions on Damages in 
Commercial Cases in California (1960) 12 Hastings L . .T. 109, 119-121; 
Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of 
the Law (1965) 53 Cal.L.Rev. 151; Hetland, The California Land Con-
tract (1960) 48 Ca1.L.Rev. 729; Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law 
of Contracts (1961) 13 Stan.L.Rev. 812, 849·856; Smith, Contractual 
Con11'ols of Damages in Commercial Transactions (1960) 12 Hastings 
L.J. 122, 134·140; Note, Is it Possible to Contract for an Exact Per-
formance.? (1949) 37 Cal.L.Rev. 498; Note, Rights of the Defaulting 
Vendee (1949) 37 Ca1.L.Rev. 704; Comment, Defaulting Vendee Relieved 
from Forfeiture (1949) 2 Stan.L.Rev. 235; Note, Installment Land Sale 
Contract: Termination of the Vendee's Rights After Default (1956) 
3 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 264; Note, Application ot Civil Code, Section 3275 to 
Relieve trom FOl·teifure (1949) 23 So.CaJ.L.Rev. 110. 
l 
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which the option can be exercised but only to secure relief 
from the provision making time of the essence in tendering 
the annual payments. (See Scarbery v. Bill Patch Land ((7 
lVater 00. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 87, 102, 103 [7 Cal.Rptr. 
408].) In a proper case, relief will be granted under section 
3275 from such a provision. (Barkis v. Bcott, supra, at p. 
122.) 
[3] The sole issue in this case is whether the plaintiffs 
have brought themselves within section 3275; whether there 
would be a loss in the nature of a forfeiture. suffered by plain-
tiffs if the option contract were terminated. Essentially, the 
position of defendant is that there is no forfeiture since plain-
tiffs got precisely what they bargained for, namely, the exclu-
sive right to buy the property for the three years during 
which they made payments. Cancellation because of the late 
1966 payment amounts to nothing more than terminating a 
contract providing for that exclusive right during 1966. As 
viewed by defendant, this contract is in effect wholly execu-
tory and therefore its termination would not result in a for-
feiture to either party. (Martin v. Morgan (1890) 87 Cal. 203 
[25 P. 350, 22 Am.St.Rep. 240].) 
To sustain defendant's argument, the contract would have 
to be viewed as a series of independent contracts, each for a 
one-year option. Only if this were true, could it be said that 
plaintiffs received their bargained for equivalent of the 
$30,000 payments. (Sheveland v. Reed (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 
820, 822 [324 P.2d 633].) The economic realities of the trans-
action, however, do not support this analysis. First, the lan-
guage of the agreement states that the "Optionors hereby 
grant to Optionee the exclusive right and option for a :five 
year period. . . ." The parties agreed to bind themselves to a 
period of :five years with the price payable in five installments. 
On the basis of risk allocation, it is clear that each payment of 
the $10,000 installment was partially for an option to buy the 
land during that year and partially for a renewal of the 
option for another year up to a total of five years. With the 
passage of time, plaintiffs have paid more and more for the 
right to renew, and it is this right that would be forfeited by 
requiring payment strictly on time. At the time the forfeiture 
was declared, plaintiffs had paid a substantial part of the 
$30,000 for the right to exercise the option during the last two 
years. Thus, they have not received what they bargained for 
and they have lost more than the benefit of their bargain. In 
short, they will suffer a forfeiture of that part of the $30,000 
) 
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attributable to the right to exercise the option during the last 
two years.s 
Plaintiffs have at all times remained willing and able to 
continue with the performance of the contract and have acted 
in good faith to accomplish this end. Defendant has not 
suffered any injury justifying termination of the contract, 
and none of his reasonable expectations have been defeated.' 
Moreover, he will receive the benefit of his bargain, namely, 
the full price of the option granted plaintiffs. As we stated in 
Barkis, "when the default has not been serious and the 
vendee is willing and able to continue with his performance of 
the contract, the vendor suffers no damage by allowing the 
vendee to do so." (Barkis v. Scott, supra, at p. 122.) 
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed to 
enter a. summary judgment for plaintiffs in accord with the 
views herein expressed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
3Plaintiffs also allege forfeiture of "great amounts of money" ex-
pended for the development of surrounding land. Evidently none of the 
investment was made in the option property. Since there is nothing to 
indicate that the development was not highly profitable in its own right 
01' that inclusion of defendant's property was necessary to make the 
dovelopment a success, it would not seem that any part of these expendi-
tures can be considered forfeite<l by a termination of the eontract. (Cf. 
Scarbery v. Bill Patch Land t/' Water Co., supra, where the plaintiff 
offered evidence justifying the allocation of eollateral development ex-
penditures to the amounts forfeited by cancellation.) 
·Although the initial tender was made to defendant and his wife and 
not to the Security Title Insurance Company as the escrow instruetions 
specified, it gave defendant notice within one day of thQ due date that 
plaintiffs sought to keep the contract in force. 
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